Freedom of Speech by Maxman, Melissa H.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 85 
Issue 5 Issue 5&6 
1987 
Freedom of Speech 
Melissa H. Maxman 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Melissa H. Maxman, Freedom of Speech, 85 MICH. L. REV. 947 (1987). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol85/iss5/10 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH. By Eric Barendt. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 1985. Pp. xxii, 314. $64. 
Eric Barendt's1 Freedom of Speech begins by noting the paucity of 
books exploring "comparative civil liberties law," despite the topic's 
"growing interest in Britain" (p. v). Barendt attempts to "fill part of 
this gap" (p. v) in his comparative treatment of free speech law in 
England, the United States, West Germany, and under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 2 The book categorizes a vast body of 
material, uncovers common doctrine, and, from a British scholar's 
perspective, suggests areas in which English common law should con-
sider adopting features of other systems. 
The introductory chapter, Why Protect Free Speech?, structures the 
book. Barendt gives "a short and inevitably oversimplified" analysis 
9f "three prominent free speech theories" (p. 7). The theories are 
slight variations of the policy rationales recognized as the theoretical 
underpinnings of American first amendment doctrine. 3 Barendt calls 
them (i) "Mill's argument from truth," (ii) "Free speech as an aspect 
of self-fulfillment," and (iii) "The argument from citizen ·participation 
in a democracy."4 He then describes the freedom of expression5 law in 
1. Fellow and Tutor in Law, St. Catherine's College, Oxford. Barendt is co-author, with A.I. 
Ogus, of the British treatise THE LAW OF SOCIAL SECURITY (2d ed. 1982). 
2. The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has been lauded 
as the "most important product" of the multi-national organization, the Council of Europe. 
M.A. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. 0SAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADIDONS 120 (1985). 
Created and signed by the Council's twenty-one member nations in 1950, the European Conven-
tion is a document which explicitly sets out the fundamental rights of individual citizens of its 
member states. Its provisions are "enforced" (admittedly more through publicity than direct 
sanctions) by the Council's European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg. The European 
Convention has, nevertheless, played an important role in safeguarding human rights through its 
impact on individual nation's laws, especially nations whose constitutions did not already include 
a bill of rights. Id. See also T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EU-
ROPEAN COMMUNITY (1981). 
3. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1 (1978); G. GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 974-79 (11th ed. 1985). 
4. The "argument from truth" reflects John Stuart Mill's idea that truth is a fundamental 
good that can be ascertained over time, but not without open discussion of facts and judgments, 
regardless of their veracity. P. 8. Society can only identify ultimate truth through the argument 
and challenges to potential truths resulting from unrestricted expression of ideas and informa-
tion. Citing F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY ch. 2 (1982), Barendt 
distinguishes this "argument from truth" from Justice Holmes' variation of this theory, con-
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the surveyed systems, noting that all four systems derive their free 
speech principles from some combination of these rationales. The au-
thor uses these three theories to unify the book, by exploring the mani-
festations of each system's differing degrees of reliance on each theory. 
Barendt applies these theories to seven broad categories of mod-
em-day free speech problems, each of which makes up a chapter of the 
book: prior restraints, political speech, libel/invasion of privacy, pub-
lic order, judicial process, obscenity, and freedom of association. The 
categories represent murky legal areas in which "free speech" cannot 
be absolute because an individual's freedom of expression right im-
pinges on another's, or the state's, interests in limiting expression. The 
limiting interests can range from society's peace and safety (p. 192) to 
an individual's right to privacy (p. 173). 
Barendt shows that all four legal systems employ each theory in 
different contexts, with varying degrees of success. Obviously, no one 
theory can resolve every free speech controversy, and Barendt marks 
the points at which each theory is inadequate to deal with a problem. 
Among other difficulties, the author highlights problems each theory 
has in enumerating which types of ideas and modes of conveyance are 
protected, and in resolving conflicts between the rights of the speaker, 
the listener, and the state. Unfortunately, however, when the theories 
become insufficient, Barendt's analysis also seems unsatisfying. 
Chapter Six, Libel and Invasion of Privacy, is illustrative of this 
problem. Barendt first delineates the private rights in conflict, in this 
case, the speaker's freedom to speak against her subject's right to repu-
tation (p. 173). Libel and invasion of privacy are corollary causes of 
action arising out of this conflict (p. 174); invasion of privacy is an 
alternative to libel for "public figures," who are vulnerable to unique 
intrusions (pp. 189-90). Barendt first addresses libel, detailing the 
ceived in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) ("the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ..•. "). P. 9. Some com-
mentators do not call attention to the differences between Mill's and Holmes' theories, but to the 
similarities. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 979. 
The "aspect of self-fulfillment" theory sees free speech as an "integral aspect of each individ· 
ual's right to self-development and fulfillment." P. 14. This theory accentuates the value to 
individuals served by free speech (self-determination, autonomy), rather than the good to society 
as a whole, protected by the arguments from truth or democracy. 
The "argument from citizen participation in a democracy" is the most popular rationale used 
"in modern Western democracies." P. 20. This rationale sets the ultimate goal of free speech as 
preservation of democracy by sustaining individual access to uninhibited public debate on polit· 
ical issues: without discussion, public opinion cannot form in a meaningful way. 
5. Following Barendt's practice, this Notice uses the terms "freedom of speech" and "free· 
dom of expression" interchangeably. As the author points out in his second chapter, " 'Speech' 
is really a term of art when used in constitutions, and courts should ask whether, in the light of 
the reasons for protecting expression from legal regulation and so adopting a free speech princi· 
ple, the type of communication in issue should be covered by the principle." P. 38. 
While this second chapter, entitled The Meaning of Speech, is devoted to the question of 
precisely what modes of communication are covered by free speech protections, this Notice fo· 
cuses on the analysis that follows this initial discussion. 
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English, American, and German6 approaches to when and whether 
libel is protected speech. He finds the German position 
midway between those taken by English and United States law. Like the 
former, it draws a distinction between assertions of [t]act and of opinion, 
conferring a higher degree of protection on the latter .... On the other 
hand, in its willingness to grant some immunity for libels committed 
during the course of political and public debate, and in its recognition · 
that the publication of some exaggerations and inaccuracies should be 
tolerated, the [German] Constitutional Court's approach is similar to 
that of the Supreme Court in Washington. [p. 187] 
Barendt has more difficulty categorizing the invasion of privacy 
aspect of the conflict. Because the right an individual must assert in 
protecting her privacy mandates shielding some information from 
public exposure, a "conflict" is generated "between the conclusions 
suggested by the arguments from democracy and Mill's truth ration-
ale" (p. 190). This conflict is one with which all three systems contin-
ually struggle: the free speech theories often collide during the critical 
determination of the reach of an individual's rights. Yet Barendt's 
handling of this important quandary is disappointing. Where he could 
have used this opportunity to make just about any point he wished -
a preference or dislike for a theory, or a legal system's approach - he 
merely remarks on the need for flexible rules. 
This lack of directional signals is confusing. As the book develops, 
the reader can see patterns in Barendt's analysis, and generate her own 
theses about his purpose. Yet not until the concluding chapter is 
Barendt's message apparent: Britain would benefit by adopting a con-
stitutional free speech clause (pp. 304-07). Even then, it is not com-
pletely clear why he arrives at this conclusion. Although in preceding 
chapters he often notes the limited arsenal available to British judges 
for protecting free expression, this is counterbalanced by equally fre-
quent warnings against absolutist protection of expression. The over-
all impression is ambiguous. 
The book is most valuable in its self-described function as a "de-
tailed account of the law of the various jurisdictions" (p. vi). Barendt 
clearly explains the nuances of an intricate and often subtly differenti-
ated mass of transnational rules. However, vague design leaves the 
reader adrift, to make her own guesses about what to do with so much 
information. 
For example, the four legal systems are facially very different. The 
United States' first amendment is extremely vague, inducing much 
controversy (pp. 31-33). The United States also consistently applies 
the most "liberal" standards in the sense that it is the most protective 
of even "extremist" free speech (p. 157). Barendt seems to suggest a 
6. There are no relevant European Convention decisions for some topics. Thus, Barendt 
often either omits them, or treats them very briefly, as he does in this chapter. 
950 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:947 
relationship between this vague constitutional language, and the more 
"liberal" formulas the United States Supreme Court uses to implement 
the document (pp. 31-32). Meanwhile, England has no written Bill of 
Rights; it relies on common law free speech doctrine (pp. 29-30). The 
English law represents the other end of a limited spectrum, generally 
providing the least protection to free speech. Its courts are somewhat 
more comfortable finding that competing interests outweigh - or, 
carve out exceptions to - common law free speech interests (pp. 30-
31, 304). Finally, compared to the United States or England, West 
Germany's Article 5 of the Basic Law, and the European Convention's 
Article 10, both written in the middle of the twentieth century, are 
extremely explicit in their language. 7 Detailed language requires mini-
mal judicial elaboration. Thus, the German and the European Con-
vention approaches fall somewhere between those of the American 
and the English. 
Perhaps the most interesting element of Barendt's presentation of 
these facial differences is how much it brings out their similarities. 
The differences do not seem fundamental: variations seem to be only 
of degree. However, Barendt never directly states this idea. He treats 
it only by inference. Parallels between the four judicial interpretations 
remain with the reader only because of the book's organization, not 
because of any explicit consideration given them by the author. The 
discussed focus on shared doctrinal underpinnings advances this end. 
Beyond this, Barendt's juxtapositional method naturally calls atten-
tion to underlying similarities, because the differences are relatively 
obvious ones inherent in the systems' structures. Barendt's descrip-
tion of the elements of each system (pp. 28-36) also reinforces like-
nesses between plans. 
It is surprising that Barendt does not direct his audience's atten-
tion to this idea more vigorously, because the modest nature of the 
differences between the systems is key to another of Barendt's themes. 
He designed the work, at least in part, to counter England's apprehen-
sions about adoption of a written free speech clause (pp. 304-07). His 
7. Article 5 (1) of the German Basic Law provides, 
Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by speech, writ· 
ing and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of 
the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed. There 
shall be no censorship. 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 5 (1) (W. Ger.), quoted at P· 33. 
Article 10 (1) of the European Convention provides, 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring 
the licensing of broadcasting, television, or cinema enterprises. 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS art. 10 (I), 
quoted at p. 35. 
Notably, the European provisions specifically address the rights of both the speaker and 
recipient of information, and illustrate what may qualify as protected speech. 
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comparison ultimately achieves this on two levels. First, he shows 
that written documents produce a range of responses, both within and 
across legal systems. This fact belies the assertion that writings are 
intrinsically inflexible. More importantly, he shows that, even factor-
ing in the potential for extremist interpretation of vague language, all 
of the systems restrain free expression, considerably in some areas. 
The entire range of judicial responses across systems falls within a lim-
ited spectrum. Barendt concludes that "constitutional courts are gen-
erally relatively cautious in their interpretation of a free speech 
clause," (p. 300), due to a number of factors, such as deference to the 
legislature (p. 149) and protection of the court's own integrity (p. 222-
23). Thus, adoption of a free speech clause does not require becoming 
as "liberal" as the United States Supreme Court. Even if the British 
Parliament enacted constitutional language as vague as that of the 
United States, its interpretation would not necessarily be very far from 
the procedure already employed in England - and in a number of 
other Western jurisdictions as well. 
Finally, as an American, this reader cannot appreciate some of 
Barendt's argument regarding the English constitutional dilemma as 
intimately as, no doubt, his British audience can. His purpose is as 
foreign as, perhaps, the American debate over national health insur-
ance proposals might be to an uninitiated British legal reader. Unfor-
tunately, comprehension is limited by respective socializations. 
Having said this, there remains one criticism particularly germane 
to comparative legal inquiry. Freedom of Speech is somewhat disap-
pointing, not because of any lack of thoroughness, but, as mentioned, 
due to the lack of a persuasive picture of the whole. Professor Inga 
Markovits makes this point about the shortcomings of comparative 
analysis especially well in a recent review of a another comparative 
work. 8 Criticizing comparative legal academics as limiting their roles 
to that of "gatherers" of information, she tries to answer "[w]hy is so 
much of comparative law work so unsatisfying in general?"9 She sug-
gests that the "comparative method" is "good at placing information 
into proper doctrinal slots, at comparing the technicalities of different 
legal regulations, and ... even at exploring the functional differences 
and similarities between ... systems. But [comparativists] are not 
very good at asking questions going beyond that."10 Markovits aptly 
summarizes what turns out to be the disappointment with Freedom of 
Speech as, 
[N]ever experienc[ing] a developing argument, advancing step-by-step 
8. Markovits, Hedgehogs or Foxes?: A Review of Westen's and Sch/eider's Zivilrecht im Sys-
temvergleich, 34 AM. J. COMP. LAW 113 (1986). Hedgehogs or Foxes? is a fresh, thoughtful 
critique of comparative legal work in general. 
9. Id. at 114-15. 
IO. Id. at 115. 
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from hypothesis to result. Rather, we get an explanation or an enlight-
ening aside whenever our progress through the material provides a suita-
ble occasion. 11 
Barendt does not fall into this trap entirely, for he uses his intro-
ductory chapter as a theoretical launching point. His framework 
clearly seeks to identify the transnational common denominator in free 
speech law, what Professor Markovits dubbed "looking for the one 
thing rather than the many, for the one thing in the many."12 Fur-
thermore, Barendt has a point to make; the problem is that he never 
brings it home. There remains a vacuum where analysis begs for a 
statement summarizing what Barendt thought readers should have 
gleaned from each.fresh example. Not until the final chapter can the 
reader piece together his purpose, beyond that of an exhaustive ac-
cumulation and organization of four not-all-that-dissimilar approaches 
to an admittedly complex legal area. Perhaps the breadth of his cover-
age itself forces the sacrifice of analytical acuity. Barendt would make 
his point more powerfully, especially to an unenlightened foreigner, if 
he pulled together his numerous strands for his audience earlier and 
more often. 13 
- Melissa H. Maxman 
11. Id. at 117. 
12. Id. at 114 (emphasis in original). 
13. This points to yet another question about comparative inquiry. Given the limitations 
cultural backgrounds impose, the question becomes: Is it inherently futile for an American to 
attempt to comprehend (and, for that matter, review) on a meaningful level a work uniquely 
designed to persuade the British mind? 
